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Abstract  
 
Several studies on the expiration of IPO lockups document a strong negative reaction 
even though the unlock event is devoid of any informational content.  The empirical 
finding has remained a conundrum.  In this paper, we find that changes in liquidity can 
account for the observed stock price reaction around lockup expiration.  Specifically, 
firms which show improvement in liquidity subsequent to the unlock day experience 
positive abnormal returns in the post-expiration period, and vice versa. Another 
interesting conclusion that emerges from our research is that liquidity changes can predict 
future abnormal returns.  Our results remain robust to the use of alternate procedures to 
characterize unexpected changes in liquidity.   
 
Keywords: Lockup expiration, Illiquidity  
JEL Classification: G14, G24, G32 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1341465
2 
 
1. Introduction 
As volumes of new research papers in financial economics are produced, we glean fresh 
insights into the workings of financial markets.  Paradoxically, researchers frequently 
uncover fresh conundrums.  The focus in our paper is on the pioneering work of Field 
and Hanka (2001), which documents the puzzling negative stock price reaction at lock-up 
expiration of U.S. IPOs.  The significant negative reaction at lockup expiration has 
remained an enigma since the event is devoid of informational content.  This is because 
the exact unlock date is known to market participants well before the actual occurrence.  
Several researchers have studied this phenomenon with a view to explaining this effect 
using the standard paradigms of financial economics.  However, until now the finding has 
defied a rational explanation.   
We contribute to this growing literature by offering an explanation based on 
unexpected liquidity changes following lock-up expiration.  In the remainder of this 
section, we first explain the rationale for lockups and summarize the key findings of prior 
research.  We then posit that earlier explanations leave room for further analysis, and 
subsequently proceed to highlight the key elements of our approach along with a preview 
of our results and contribution.   
Most IPOs in the U.S. feature lockup agreements that prohibit insiders and other Pre-
IPO investors from selling their shares for a specified period of time, typically 180 days.  
Lockups are not mandated by regulators but are contractual agreements between 
underwriters and issuers and the terms of the lockup are explicitly disclosed in the IPO 
prospectus.  Financial economists have offered three distinct rationales for the existence 
of lockups – a signalling solution to the adverse problem, a contracting solution to the 
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moral hazard problem, and a rent extraction mechanism by powerful underwriters.   
Empirical evidence regarding the signalling hypothesis is mixed with Brav and Gompers 
(2003) rejecting it while Brau, Lambson, and McQueen (2003) find empirical support for 
it. Brav and Gompers (2003) suggest that lockups serve as a commitment mechanism for 
the moral hazard problem.  They do not find any evidence to support the rent extraction 
hypothesis.  
Empirical evidence regarding effects of lockup expiration have been documented by 
Field and Hanka (2001) and Bradley, Jordan, Yi and Roten (2001).  There is 
overwhelming evidence of a significant negative stock price reaction at lockup 
expiration.  These researchers also document a concomitant increase in the trading 
volume after the unlock day.   The finding of negative stock price reaction challenges the 
more extreme versions of the efficient markets hypothesis.   
Several hypotheses have been proffered to explain the negative stock price reaction.  
First, the negative return at lockup expiration could be a statistical artifact caused by an 
increase in the proportion of trades executed at the bid price.  Second, price pressure 
effects could be depressing the stock prices.  Third, an increase in trading costs could be 
impacting the stock prices due to an increase in the required rate of return.  Fourth, stock 
prices could be lower due to a downward sloping demand curve for stocks.  Finally, a 
larger than expected sales by insiders could be depressing the stock prices.  Field and 
Hanka (2001) rule out the first two explanations by conducting specific empirical tests.  
Studies that focus on the market microstructure effects of lockup expiration such as Cao, 
Field and Hanka (2004), Krishnamurti and Thong (2008) and Gao (2005) do not find 
evidence of increase in bid-ask spreads following lockup expiration.  There is no 
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evidence indicating an increase in information asymmetry following lockup expiration 
that necessitates an increase in the required rate of return.  The downward sloping 
demand curve hypothesis is ruled out by the evidence of Bradley, Jordan, Yi and Roten 
(2001) who show that CARs are negative and statistically significant even for the 
subsample of stocks that have lower trading volume after unlock day as compared to the 
lockup period.  Finally, Field and Hanka (2001) find that abnormal return is significantly 
negative even when no insider sales are reported. Thus we can conclude that the negative 
stock price reaction is not driven by worse-than-expected insider sales. 
Summing up, extant research does not offer a complete explanation regarding the 
negative stock price reaction at lockup expiration.  The existing literature leaves two 
significant lacunae regarding the impact of lockup expiration on stock prices.  First, the 
finding of negative stock price reaction at lockup expiration challenges the more extreme 
versions of efficient markets hypothesis as it does not address the question as to how the 
events of the unlock day could be consistently worse than expected.   Second, prior work 
has not examined the linkage between market microstructure effects of lockup expiration 
and cumulative abnormal returns in the periods surrounding lockup expiration.   
We remedy these issues in the literature by pursuing an explanation based on changes 
in liquidity in the post-lockup period.  We posit that liquidity improves for some firms 
but deteriorates for other firms in the post-lockup period. Thus the observed stock price 
reaction should be conditioned on changes in liquidity.   Using Amihud’s illiquidity 
measure to characterize changes in liquidity in the post-lockup period, we document a 
statistically significant association between deterioration in liquidity and cumulative 
abnormal returns.  Our results are robust to alternative ways of characterizing changes in 
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liquidity.  Additionally, we find that liquidity changes can predict future abnormal 
returns. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains a brief review of the 
literature and the theory that motivates our study. Section 3 describes our sample and 
provides summary statistics. Our principal empirical results are discussed in Section 4. 
We provide robustness checks by using alternate procedures to characterize liquidity 
changes in Section 5.  In Section 6, we examine the ability of liquidity changes to predict 
future stock returns.  Our conclusions are contained in the final section. 
 
2. Literature Review 
2.1 Current Explanations of Lockup Expiration Effects  
Several hypotheses have been offered to potentially explain the observed negative 
abnormal returns around lockup expiration.  We describe them below and summarize the 
empirical evidence regarding their validity. 
(a) Statistical Artifact Hypothesis: 
  If transactions around unlock day tend to be predominantly sell orders generated 
by insiders that are executed at the bid, then transaction prices around unlock day will be 
spuriously negative, even if there is no change in bid or ask prices. Field and Hanka 
(2001) show empirical evidence that indicates that abnormal returns around unlock day is 
driven by permanent, parallel drops in both the bid and ask prices.  The abnormal return 
is not driven by a change in the proportion of trades that occur at the bid price.     
(b) Price Pressure Hypothesis: 
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One of the hypotheses offered to explain the negative abnormal return around lockup 
expiration is the price pressure hypothesis.  On the unlock day share prices may be 
temporarily depressed due to a large flow of sell orders. Thus a temporary price drop is 
necessary in equilibrium to attract liquidity providers.  Field and Hanka (2001) show that 
the abnormal return reaction around unlock day is permanent with no rebound in 
subsequent weeks.  Thus the price pressure hypothesis is rejected.    
(c) Increase in Trading Cost Hypothesis: 
Another possible explanation for the negative sock price reaction during the post 
lockup period is an increase in trading costs due to a potential increase in information 
asymmetry due to insider selling activity.  Field and Hanka (2001) find little evidence of 
a meaningful increase in quoted bid-ask spreads after the unlock day.   Cao, Field and 
Hanka (2004) study the trading cost hypothesis in greater detail.  They report that despite 
considerable insider trading for some IPO firms, there is little impact on effective 
spreads.     In fact, two other liquidity measures – quoted depth and trading activity 
increase substantially.  Furthermore, they report the interesting finding that in cases 
where insiders disclose share sales spreads actually decline.  Krishnamurti and Thong 
(2008) report that both insider selling and unwinding by venture capitalists in the 
aftermath of lockup expiration are associated with a decline in quoted and effective 
spreads.   Furthermore, they attribute the decline in spreads to a decline in the adverse 
selection component of spreads.  Similar evidence is provided by Gao (2005) who shows 
that the information asymmetry of IPO stocks experience little change after the unlock 
day.    
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(d) Downward Sloping Demand Curve Hypothesis: 
This hypothesis is based on the assumption that demand curves for stocks slope 
downward.  Practitioners allude to this effect as the “scarcity premium” for IPOs with 
small public float.  On lockup expiration day, the public float of stocks increase 
permanently as insiders unload their holdings.  The demand curve effect posits a negative 
stock price reaction.  The Downward Sloping Demand Curve hypothesis differs from the 
price pressure effect in that the former is a permanent effect while the latter is caused by 
a temporary increase in the flow of sell orders. 
Empirical evidence regarding Downward Sloping Demand Curve hypothesis is 
mixed.  Field and Hanka (2001) report that abnormal return around the unlock day is 
significantly more negative the larger the fraction of outstanding shares that are locked 
up.  But further tests do not lend support to the Downward Sloping Demand Curve 
hypothesis.  Sixty percent of the sub-sample of firms where the total three-day trading 
volume is less than 1% of the public float, experience negative abnormal returns.   In the 
case of firms whose three-day trading volume is below their own pre-unlock mean 
volume, the corresponding three-day abnormal return is still significantly negative. 
(e) High Unexpected Insider Sales Hypothesis: 
Insider sales are expected to elicit negative stock price reaction since they reflect a 
lack of insider confidence and suggest a reduction in insiders’ incentives to maximize 
firm value.  Field and Hanka (2001) study the abnormal return of the sub-sample of firms 
that report insider sales to SEC during the 2-week period centred on the unlock day.    
They find statistically significant negative abnormal returns.  However, even for the sub-
sample with no reported insider sales, the abnormal return remains significantly negative.   
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Thus we conclude that the abnormal return on unlock day is probably not driven solely 
by unexpectedly high insider sales.   
 Unfortunately, none of the hypotheses examined by prior researchers gives us a 
rational explanation of the preponderantly negative stock price reaction observed at 
lockup expiration.  We are left with two alternatives – (i) conclude that the negative 
abnormal stock price reaction is an anomaly unexplained by rational investor behavior or 
(ii) pursue an alternative explanation grounded in investor rationality.   We follow the 
latter approach, basing our explanation on changes in liquidity of IPO issues after the 
unlock day.  Our approach is elucidated in the following subsection.         
 2.2 An Alternative View of Liquidity 
Our explanation of the lockup expiration effect on stock prices is based on changes in 
liquidity.  We argue that lockup expiration is an event that alters the liquidity 
characteristics of IPO firms.  These changes in liquidity arise from the selling of 
corporate insiders, venture capitalists and others that were explicitly prohibited from 
selling their holdings prior to the unlock day.  We posit that the change in liquidity after 
the unlock day for a given stock is partially unpredictable.   Specifically, the market’s 
perception of information asymmetry following lockup expirations would depend on ex 
ante expectations of whether insiders have private information.  These expectations 
would vary in the cross-section but would be difficult to measure using publicly available 
variables prior to lockup expirations.  Thus, sales by insiders after lockup expiration may 
be interpreted as an increase in information asymmetry only in some cases.  Firms that 
experience unexpected increases in information asymmetry would experience a 
deterioration in liquidity while other firms may experience an improvement in liquidity.   
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An unexpected deterioration in market liquidity should lower contemporaneous stock 
prices.  This is due to the fact that higher realized illiquidity raises expected illiquidity.  
This in turn raises the expected stock returns and lowers stock prices.  Thus our principal 
hypothesis is that stocks which experience deterioration in liquidity, should experience 
negative abnormal returns at lockup expiration.  For stocks which show no perceptible 
change, there should be no significant stock price reaction.  Stocks which exhibit 
improvements in liquidity should consequently experience positive abnormal reaction 
after the unlock day.   
One of the major hurdles in implementing a test of our hypothesis is a precise 
definition of liquidity.  According to Amihud (2002) “liquidity is an elusive concept”.  
There are several dimensions of liquidity.  Illiquidity can be characterized as the price 
impact of order flow.  For standard-size transactions, Glosten and Milgrom (1985) show 
that bid-ask spread is a good measure of price impact.  When excess demand or excess 
supply is large bid-ask spread is not a good measure of price impact.  Kyle (1985) and 
Silber (1975) developed other measures of illiquidity that could be useful under situations 
of excess demand or excess supply.  Kyle (1985) develops the price impact measure, λ, 
which has been extensively applied in market microstructure research.  Silber (1975) 
employs a measure of thinness which is defined as the ratio of absolute price change to 
absolute excess demand for trading. 
Liquidity has a price dimension and a quantity dimension.  Furthermore, liquidity can 
also be measured based on the informativeness of transactions.   Thus it is possible that 
the lockup expiration event has positive impact on some measures of liquidity but 
negative effect on other measures of liquidity for a given stock.  A further difficulty 
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arises from the fact that several measures of liquidity developed by financial economists 
require detailed tick-by-tick data on quotes and trades of the stocks.  In the real world, 
traders may not have real-time access or the time to process such detailed information in 
order to detect a change in liquidity of a given stock.  Thus we need an easy to compute 
measure that is sufficiently comprehensive.   
A thorough search of the literature led us to Amihud’s illiquidity measure as the most 
suitable measure for our purpose.  We are encouraged to use this measure due to the 
following two reasons.  First, Amihud’s illiquidity measure is strongly positively related 
to Kyle’s λ, a price impact measure and ψ, the fixed cost component related to the bid-
asked spread.  Second, Amihud’s illiquidity measure has substantial explanatory power to 
explain returns in an asset pricing model framework with illiquidity as a priced factor.  
Finally, Amihud (2002) shows that illiquidity affects small stocks more strongly than 
large firms thus accounting for the time series variation in their premiums.   
Amihud (2002) defined his measure of illiquidity as follows:  
 ILLIQi = 1/D ∑ |Rit |  / VOLDit  
where Rit is the return on stock i on day t. VOLDit is the dollar volume for stock i on day 
t.  D represents the number of days over which the ILLIQ measure is computed.  This 
measure is interpreted as the average daily stock price reaction to a dollar of trading 
volume.  Amihud (2002) shows that this measure of expected market illiquidity has a 
positive and significant effect on ex ante stock excess returns.  Amihud (2002) further 
validates his measure by showing that ILLIQ is related to Kyle’s λ and ψ the fixed cost 
component related to the bid-ask spread.  
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 Lockup expiration is accompanied by potential increases in insider selling and 
unloading of shares by venture capitalists.  These investors were prohibited from doing so 
in the pre-expiration period.  Thus the lockup expiration event is likely to significantly 
alter the informativeness of trades, especially in those cases when a lot of insider selling 
takes place.  In other cases, liquidity may improve simply due to the larger float of 
available shares.  Therefore, the lockup expiration event is likely to affect the liquidity 
characteristics of stocks.  In particular, we expect that some stocks will become more 
liquid after expiration while others may become less liquid.  Ex ante, it would be very 
difficult to predict the changes in liquidity of an individual stock after the lockup 
expiration.  In the framework of Amihud (2002), changes in liquidity should have an 
impact on the value of the firm.  This is the primary motivation of our paper.  
 
3. Data and Sample Characteristics  
The IPO data are obtained from the Securities Data Corporation (SDC) New Issue 
database and covers the 1993 – 2005 period.  We exclude unit offerings, closed-end 
funds, ADRs, REITs, and IPOs with offer prices under $5 from our sample.   For a firm 
to be included, the stock prices, the trade and quote data, and the insider trading 
information must be available on the Center for Research in Securities Prices (CRSP), 
NYSE’s Trade and Quote (TAQ), and Thomson Financial Insider Filing databases, 
respectively.  These data selection criteria yield a sample size of 1609 IPOs listed on 
NYSE and NASDAQ.  We use SDC database to obtain the basic information on offer 
date, lockup expiration date, offer price, filing prices, number of shares issued, net 
proceeds, venture capital funding, number of lead and co-lead managers, lockup days, 
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lockup shares, and over-allotment of shares.  The insider selling information in the post-
lockup expiration period is obtained from the SEC Form 4 provided by Thomson 
Financial Insider Filing database.
1
 We extract the financial information, such as total 
assets, total liabilities, net income, return on assets (ROA), and debt-to-asset ratio from 
the Compustat database.  All financial data are based on the most recent fiscal year 
ending prior to the IPO lockup expiration date.  Firm age is measured from the founding 
year to the IPO year and is obtained from Jay Ritter’s website 
(http://bear.cba.ufl.edu/ritter).  Market value is defined as first day closing price times the 
post-IPO shares outstanding and is obtained from the CRSP database.   
For each IPO, we also retrieve the trade and quote data from the NYSE’s TAQ 
database, and omit the following to minimize data errors: (1) quotes if either the ask price 
or bid price is less than or equal to zero; (2) quotes if either the ask size or the bid size is 
less than or equal to zero; (3) quotes if the bid price is greater than or equal to the ask 
price; (4) quotes if the bid-ask spread is greater than $5; (5) before-the-open and after-
the-close trades and quotes; (6) trades if the price or volume is less than or equal to zero; 
(7) out-of-sequence trades and quotes.   
Table 1 contains the descriptive statistics of our sample.  Panel A contains offer and 
firm characteristics of the entire sample.  In panel B, we provide descriptive statistics of 
our sample categorized on the basis of liquidity changes.    On average our sample firms 
offer 4.11 million shares in the IPO garnering net proceeds of $60.94 million.  The 
average offer price is $12.64.  The filing price range averages 17.24%.  Offer-to-close 
returns average 20.33%.  On average, there are 2.80 underwriters per issue.  The firms in 
                                                 
1
 Insider selling in pre-lockup expiration period is identified as early release of lockup. Insiders are defined 
as directors, committees, officers, affiliates, and beneficial owners. 
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our sample have an average age of 14.62 years when they go public.  The average lockup 
period is 194.75 days with a median of 180 days.  12.80 million shares are locked up on 
average.  The number of shares outstanding averages 16.87 million.  Thus about 69.5% of 
the outstanding shares are typically locked up.  The total assets and total liabilities of the 
sample average $218.24 million and $187.27 million respectively.  The market value of 
equity averages $311.35 million.  Thus the average market-to-book ratio is about 8.71.  
The average Net Income (NI) and Return on Assets (ROA) of our sample firms are 
negative while the medians are positive.  This indicates the presence of influential 
outliers.  We therefore rely on medians to characterize the average firm.  The median NI 
of our sample is $ 0.83 million.  The median value of ROA is 11.4%.  Debt-to-Assets 
ratio averaged 35.5% with a median of 26.1%.    
In Panel B of Table 1, we compare the offer and firm characteristics of sub samples 
based on liquidity changes.   We split the sample into two groups on the basis of changes 
in liquidity in the post-lockup period as compared to the pre-lockup period.  Firms whose 
ratio of Amihud illiquidity measure in the post-lockup [+21,+ 40] to pre-lockup [-40,-21] 
period is less than 1 are classified as liquid firms (LIQ).
2
  Firms with ratios exceeding one 
are considered as illiquid firms (ILLIQ). We find that most of the offer and firm 
characteristics of the two sub samples are similar.  However, there are a few differences 
between the two subsamples.  On average, LIQ firms tend to have a larger quantity of 
over-allotment shares and a higher number of underwriters. LIQ firms generally have 
lower leverage as compared to ILLIQ firms.  
                                                 
2
 Our windows for measuring pre-and post-lockup periods exclude the (-20,+20) window that is used for 
computing the cumulative abnormal returns.  This is done to obviate a potential measurement problem.   
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Table 2 provides quote and trade characteristics of our entire sample and sub-samples 
based on post-expiration liquidity changes.  We examine the spreads, depths, number of 
quotes, number of trades, trade size, trading value, and returns volatility during 20-day 
pre- and post-lockup expiration periods.  Of special interest to us in this paper is the 
change in liquidity in the post-lockup expiration as compared to the lockup period.  As 
before, our pre-lockup window is [-40,-21] with respect to the unlock day. The post-
lockup window is [+21,+ 40].    When we look at the entire sample, we find that on 
average, quoted and effective dollar spreads reduce significantly in the post-lockup 
period as compared to the pre-lockup period. When, we examine the quoted and effective 
spreads, we notice a statistically significant increase in the post-expiration window as 
compared to the pre-expiration period. We thus conclude that dollar spread decreases by 
less than the decrease in stock prices resulting in a marginal increase in percentage 
spreads. Total depth and its constituents, bid depth and ask depth increase substantially in 
the post-lockup period as compared to the period prior to the unlock day. The number of 
quotes recorded registers a substantial increase in the post-lockup period.  
A similar pattern emerges when we examine the trade activities in the post-lockup 
period and compare them with the pre-lockup period. The number of trades, trade size 
and trading value all show statistically significant increases in the post-lockup period as 
compared to the pre-lockup expiration period. However, the mean return volatility does 
not change significantly in the post-lockup expiration period.       
We next compare the market microstructure variables of the LIQ subsample during 
the pre- and post-lockup expiration periods.  Several interesting facts emerge.  First, 
while quoted and effective dollar spreads decline in the post-lockup period as observed in 
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the overall sample, the quoted and effective percentage spreads also decline.  This is in 
direct contrast to our findings for the overall sample.  It appears that there is a more than 
proportionate decline in dollar spreads as compared to the change in average stock prices 
in the post-lockup period.  Similar to our findings for the overall sample, we document 
increases in depth, number of quotes, number of trades, trade size, and trading value in 
the post-lockup period as compared to the pre-lockup period.    Second, our result for 
return volatility comparisons of the LIQ subsample is different from that observed for the 
overall sample. We find that return volatility declines substantially in the post-lockup 
period for the LIQ subsample while the overall sample showed no change.  
We then compare the market microstructure variables of our ILLIQ subsample during 
the pre- and post-lockup expiration periods. We notice several differences as compared to 
the LIQ subsample.  There is no change in the quoted dollar spread in the post-lockup 
period as compared to the pre-lockup period.  There is a slight decrease in the effective 
dollar spread in the post-lockup period. Both quoted and effective percentage spreads 
show statistically significant increases in the post-lockup period as compared to pre-
unlock period.  This finding is exactly opposite to our finding for the LIQ subsample. 
There is no significant change in depth after the expiration of lockup.  A number of trade 
related microstructure variables clearly show a significant deterioration during the post-
lockup period. The number of trades, trade size and trading value all decline significantly 
in the post-lockup period as compared to the pre-lockup period. Return volatility 
increases significantly in the post-lockup period as compared to the pre-lockup period 
signifying a deteriorating trading environment.        
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Finally, we compare the key market microstructure variables across the LIQ and 
ILLIQ subsamples during our pre- and post-lockup windows. First, we perform 
comparisons during the pre-lockup period.  We do not find compelling evidence that the 
liquidity characteristics of the two subsamples are substantially different during the pre-
lockup expiration period. However, four out of the twelve variables examines show that 
the LIQ subsample is more liquid than the ILLIQ subsample.  These are: quoted 
percentage spread, effective percentage spread,, number of quotes, and return volatility.  
For the eight other variables studied, the liquidity characteristics of the two subsamples 
are statistically indistinguishable.           
Next, we compare the liquidity characteristics of the two subsamples during the post-
lockup period. We find a striking difference between the two subsamples.  For every 
measure we examine, we find that the LIQ subsample shows better liquidity than the 
ILLIQ subsample. This implies that our procedure has done an excellent job of 
identifying a subset of stocks that underwent significant liquidity deterioration in the 
post-lockup period.   
The above comparisons show that Amihud’s illiquidity measure is strongly related to 
traditional market microstructure measures used in prior research.  Furthermore it appears 
that a subset of firms (ILLIQ) experience a drastic deterioration in liquidity in the post 
unlock period.  
 
4. Empirical Results 
We use the standard event study methodology to examine stock market reaction to lockup 
expiration.  The magnitude of the security price reactions are estimated using the market 
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model with parameters estimated over days t = -120 to t=-21, where t=0 is the lockup 
expiration date.  The CRSP value-weighted index return is the proxy for the market 
return. 
We show results of event study results of lockup expiration in Table 3.  We show 
results of the overall sample and sub-samples based on liquidity changes.  In conformity 
with earlier research, we document statistically significant negative CARs for the overall 
sample using several windows such as (-1,+1), (-5,+5), (-10,+10) and (-20,+20).  On the 
expiration day, abnormal return averages -0.87% and is statistically significant at the 1% 
level. As we increase the window length CARs become more and more negative.  For the 
(-20,+20) window, we report a CAR of -4.23%, significant at the 1% level.  Median 
CARs are generally smaller in magnitude but are all statistically significant.  CARs in the 
post expiration windows of (+2, +5), (+2,+10) and (+2,+20)  are not significantly 
different from zero.  
We next segregate our sample into two groups based on post-expiration liquidity 
changes and examine the CARs for each of the windows.  The CARs of liquid and 
illiquid firms differ dramatically from each other.
3
  For the LIQ subsample CARs are 
negative and statistically significant at 1% level only for the (-1, +1) and (0,0) windows.  
Other windows that include pre-expiration periods typically do not show significant 
CARs.  Interestingly, CARs are significantly positive during the (+2, +5), (+2, +10) and 
(+2, +20) windows. The ILLIQ subsample shows significant negative CARs for all the 
                                                 
3
 Since the validity of our study critically depends on the measurement of illiquidity we use the windows (-
40,-21) and (+21,+40) as the pre- and post-lockup periods respectively. Our pre- and post-lockup windows 
exclude the (-20, +20) window that is used for computing the cumulative abnormal returns.  This is done to 
eliminate potential spurious correlation between CARs and our illiquidity measure which contains stock 
returns in the numerator.  
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windows examined. Of particular interest is the long window of (-20, +20) where we 
document a CAR of -12.09% significant at the 1% level. All post expiration windows 
show significantly negative CARs.  
A noteworthy finding of our study is the vastly divergent CAR pattern observed 
during the post-expiration windows for the LIQ and ILLIQ subsamples. The insignificant 
CAR results documented for the overall sample during the post expiration windows of 
(+2, +5), (+2, +10), and (+2, +20) is driven the combination of positive CARs of the LIQ 
subsample and the negative CARs of the ILLIQ subsample. When we compute the 
difference in CARs between the LIQ and ILLIQ subsamples for each of the windows 
studied, we observe that they are all positive and significant at the 1% level. Figure 1 
graphically portrays the dramatic divergence in CARs for the ILLIQ an LIQ subsamples 
during the (-20, +20) period.  
Having shown the relationship between CAR and liquidity changes in a univariate 
framework, we proceed to further tests utilizing a multivariate regression framework and 
report the results in Table 4.  We first regress CARs in the (-20, +20) window on a set of  
variables used in prior research in addition to three other variables: DILLIQ, OI and 
SUPPLY.  The results are reported in Panel A. Specifically, we run the following model: 
ititit
ititititititit
UWREPNYSE
TECHRUNUPSUPPLYOIINSIDEDILLIQVCCAR




98
76533210)20,20(
where, 
VC = 1 if the firm is venture capital backed and zero otherwise; 
DILLIQ = the average of the ratio of Amihud illiquidity measure of post-lockup 
(+21,+40) to pre-lockup (-21,-40) period. Amihud illiquidity measure is computed as 
|Rit|/DVOLit;  
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|Rit| is the absolute value of daily return of stock i on day t;  
DVOLit represents the dollar volume of trading of stock i on day t.  
 INSIDE = the insider selling shares in post-lockup period (0,+ 20) divided by the number 
of shares locked up; 
OI = the order imbalance defined as the sum of (sell volume – buy volume)/daily trading 
volume during the CAR window period (-20, + 20); 
SUPPLY = the sum of (daily trading volume – normal trading volume)/normal trading 
volume during (-20, +20) period.  Normal trading volume is computed based on the 
average of daily trading volume during day -120 to day -21; 
 RUNUP = the rate of return for each firm computed from closing price on listing date to 
day -41 with respect to lockup expiration; 
TECH = 1 if the firm is identified as high technology firm in SDC, zero otherwise; 
NYSE = 1 if the firm is NYSE-listed, zero otherwise; 
UWREP = 1 if Jay Ritter’s underwriter ranking is greater than 8, zero otherwise. 
DILLIQ is the principal variable of interest.  A value of DILLIQ greater than 1.0 
indicates an increase in the illiquidity of the stock in the post-expiration window of (+21, 
+40) as compared to pre-expiartion window of (-21, -40).  Thus we expect an increase in 
DILLIQ to be accompanied by a decrease in stock returns.  OI measures the cumulative 
sell side order imbalance during the window surrounding lockup expiration. As such, it is 
expected to have a negative impact on CAR.  SUPPLY quantifies the increase in trading 
volume during the window surrounding unlock day.  An increase in SUPPLY represents 
an increase in the floating stock of shares and is indicative of an improvement in 
liquidity.  We therefore expect this variable to have a positive effect on CAR.   
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As expected, DILLIQ has a negative impact on CAR and remains significant even 
when other variables are included in the regression.  This result shows that an increase in 
the illiquidity of a stock is associated with a negative stock price reaction.  We find that 
the dummy for VC-backing is associated with a statistically significant negative effect 
even after controlling for other determinants of stock price reaction.  Insider selling is 
negative and mildly significant at conventional levels.  Order Imbalance is associated 
with a negative stock price reaction and is significant at the 1% level.  The supply effect 
is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level as per expectations.  RUNUP 
represents the post-listing performance of stocks.  RUNUP has a negative impact on CAR 
and is statistically significant at the 1% level.  This implies that stocks which performed 
the best in the pre-expiration period suffer the worst stock price declines during the 
lockup expiration window. The TECH dummy shows a negative effect on CAR in 
univariate regression but the effect disappears in multivariate regressions.  NYSE listing 
has a significant negative effect on CARs indicating that the stocks listed on NYSE 
experience more negative stock price reaction at lockup expiration as compared to 
Nasdaq stocks.  Finally, underwriter reputation has no effect on CARs.   
In Panel B, we report results of regressing CAR (+2,+20) on the independent 
variables of interest.  The DILLIQ variable has a statistically significant negative impact 
on CAR indicating that firms experiencing a deterioration in liquidity also suffer negative 
CARs.  The VC dummy has a negative effect and is statistically significant.  The insider 
selling variable is not statistically significant.  Order imbalance has a negative effect on 
CAR and is statistically significant.  The supply variable has a positive effect on CAR 
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and is statistically significant.  RUNUP has a statistically significant negative effect on 
CAR as before.  TECH, NYSE and UWREP are not statistically significant.  
Note that in our univariate tests, INSIDE is associated with negative CARs.  In 
multivariate regressions when we include DILLIQ, the significance of INSIDE tends to 
drop.  We believe that there are two important reasons for the muted effect of insider 
sales on CAR.  First, insiders could be selling soon after unlock day for one of three 
reasons: diversification of their holdings, to take advantage of their private information 
regarding future prospects of the firm, and to make use of their expectation of a decline in 
overall stock market prices.  As pointed out in Section 2.2., the market’s expectations 
about the relative likelihood of each of these possibilities are not observable prior to the 
lockup expiration, and are manifested in DILLIQ.  Second, traders do not have timely 
information regarding insider sales since they are only required to disclose their trades 
via Form 4 no later than the tenth day of the month after transactions.       
Overall, the most significant result from the multivariate regression analysis is that an 
increase in illiquidity is associated with a strongly negative stock price reaction.  Our 
regression results confirm the earlier findings that VC-backed firms and those with 
reported insider selling experience significant negatively abnormal returns around lockup 
expiration.  In addition we document that order imbalance has a significant negative 
impact on CAR while the supply effect is positive.  Thus our empirical results suggest 
that the negative CAR documented at lockup expiration is associated with a deterioration 
in liquidity of a subset of stocks.         
 
 
22 
 
5.  Robustness Checks 
The empirical results shown in the previous section indicate that changes in liquidity are 
strongly negatively associated with CARs at the expiration of IPO lockups.  In this 
section, we check the robustness of our results by conducting three additional sets of 
tests.  First, we use an alternate measure of liquidity changes.  Second, we use different 
windows for measuring pre- and post-lockup expiration periods. Finally, we use an 
alternate procedure for identifying liquidity changes.  
 Our first robustness check is based on the premise that there is no universally 
accepted measure of liquidity.  We therefore construct our own index of liquidity 
changes.  The index uses the following five variables to characterize stock market 
liquidity: time-weighted percentage quoted spread, trade-weighted effective percentage 
spread, time between trades, number of trades required to transact $1 million, and daily 
return volatility.  These variables are computed for each stock and averaged during the 
pre- (-21, -40) and post- (+21, +40) lockup expiration windows.  The ratio of each 
variable (Post/Pre) is then calculated for each firm.  An equally weighted average of the 
five variables used constitutes our measure of liquidity changes.  Ratios exceeding 1.0 
indicate a post-lockup expiration deterioration in liquidity.  We use the same windows to 
denote pre- and post-lockup expiration to make our results directly comparable to that 
using Amihud’s illiquidity ratio measure.   
The variables chosen for computing the liquidity index takes into account perceptions 
of liquidity faced by various types of investors such as retail investors and institutional 
traders.  The first variable, time-weighted quoted spread denotes the perceived cost of 
liquidity faced by retail investors.  The second variable, trade-weighted effective 
23 
 
percentage spread corresponds to the cost of liquidity provision from the perspective of 
dealers making market in the stock.  The third variable, time to taken trade, which is 
measured by total trading hours divided by the number of trades, signifies the trading 
delay faced by professional traders.  The fourth variable, the number of trades required to 
transact $1 million represents a liquidity measure of interest to institutional traders 
executing high volume transactions.  Finally, the return volatility is a liquidity measure of 
interest to sophisticated investors such as hedge funds.   
  The results of our robust regressions are reported in Table 5.  In Panel A, we show 
results using the (-20, +20) CAR window.  We find that our constructed index of liquidity 
changes has a negative and statistically significant coefficient after controlling for control 
variables. We are thus able to confirm, by using an alternate measure of liquidity 
changes, that an increase in illiquidity is associated with negative stock returns in the 
period surrounding lockup expiration. In fact, our results are stronger with the 
constructed index as compared to Amihud’s illiquidity measure.   
In Panel B, we provide multivariate regression results using the (+2, +20) window for 
CAR.  Once again, we are able to provide strong confirmatory evidence that an increase 
in illiquidity is associated with a decline in stock prices in the post-lockup window.  
Barring minor changes, our principal conclusions remain unaltered.   
 Our second robustness checks involves repeating our analysis by using the (-20,-1) 
and (+1,+20) windows to denote pre- and post- lockup periods respectively.  Our 
empirical results remain qualitatively unaltered
4
.   
                                                 
4
 These results are available from the authors upon request. Since the Amihud’s illiquidity measure uses  
|Rit| there is a potential problem of spurious correlation between this measure and the CARs.  
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Our final robustness checks involve the use of a transition matrix framework to 
classify our sample stocks into groups based pre- and post-lockup illiquidity.  For each 
stock, we compute Amihud’s illiquidity measure in the 20-day period before and the 20-
day period after lockup expiration.  For each of the pre- and post- lockup expiration 
periods, we characterize stocks whose illiquidity measure was below the median as liquid 
(LIQ) and the others as illiquid (ILLIQ).  The diagonal cells [(LIQ, LIQ), and (IILIQ, 
ILLIQ) contain stocks which are expected to be relatively liquid and illiquid respectively.  
The stocks in the off-diagonal cells experience changes in liquidity in the post-lockup 
period.  For example, firms in the (LIQ, ILLIQ) cell experience declines in liquidity.   
We then compute CARs (-20, +20) for the cells of the transition matrix.  For the firms 
that became illiquid (LIQ, ILLIQ) in the post-lockup period, CAR averages -12.57% and 
is significantly more negative than those firms with expected illiquidity (ILLIQ, ILLIQ).  
Firms that became more liquid in the post-lockup period (ILLIQ, LIQ) experience 
positive CARs of 5.54% on average, which are statistically significant and higher than 
firms that are expected to be liquid.  The fact that firms that experience improvements in 
liquidity show positive CARs is particularly noteworthy.
5
   
Summing up, using our robustness checks involving three different methods, we are 
able to substantiate our primary result that changes in liquidity are strongly associated 
with the stock price reaction during the period surrounding lock-up expiration.    
 
6. Can Liquidity Changes Predict CARs? 
                                                 
5
 Detailed results are available from the others upon request.  
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So far, we have demonstrated that liquidity changes are associated with CARs around 
lockup expiration.  A related question is whether observed liquidity changes can predict 
future CARs.  We address the issue below.   
We measure liquidity changes during the pre- and post-lockup expiration 
windows of (-2, -10) and (+2, +10) and CARs during the (+11, +20) period.  We conduct 
multivariate regressions using CAR as the dependent variable and ΔILLIQ, where the 
latter represents illiquidity changes in the post-lockup period as the main independent 
variable.  We use the same control variables as in Sections 4 and 5.  The results are 
reported in Table 6.  In Model 1, we use Amihud measure for measuring illiquidity 
changes and in Model 2, we use our constructed index of liquidity changes.  Both models 
show negative and statistically significant coefficients for the ΔILLIQ variable.  This 
result indicates that firms experiencing an increase in illiquidity are predicted to suffer 
negative CARs in the subsequent period.  OI and RUNUP show negative coefficients 
whereas SUPPLY shows a positive coefficient. The other variables are not statistically 
significant. Our results are not sensitive to the definition of pre- and post-lockup 
expiration windows.   
Figure 2 graphically depicts the pattern in CARs during the (+11, +30) window.  
The figure confirms the continued divergence in CARs of the LIQ and the ILLIQ 
subsamples.  The magnitude of decline in CARs of ILLIQ firms is larger as compared to 
the increase in magnitude of LIQ firms during this window.   
In summary, we show that liquidity changes can predict future stock returns 
subsequent to the measurement period.  An implication of this finding is that stocks take 
a longer time to incorporate liquidity changes into prices. 
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7. Conclusion 
Despite considerable research on the lockup expiration of IPOs, there remain few 
satisfactory explanations for the observed negative stock price reaction.  Since the unlock 
event per se is devoid of any informational content, the empirical finding has remained a 
conundrum.  Prior studies on the market microstructure effects around unlock day do not 
find any evidence regarding deterioration in liquidity.   
Our contribution in this paper is two-fold.  First, we show that a subset of firms 
experience deterioration in liquidity during the post-lock up period.  Second, we show 
that this deterioration in liquidity is associated with negative CARs during the post-lock 
up period.  Our results are robust to the use of alternate procedures to define changes in 
liquidity.  Further research on the factors driving the observed deterioration in liquidity is 
likely to be a fruitful endeavour.   
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Figure 1 
Average CAR Around Lockup Expiration
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Figure 2 
Average CAR During Day +11 to +30
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Table 1 Descriptive Statistics 
This table presents the offer and firm characteristics for the lockup expiration sample.  The IPO sample period is from 1993 to 
2005.  Panel A and B report the means, medians, and standard deviations for all firms and liquid (LIQ) vs illiquid (ILLIQ) 
subsamples, respectively.  Liquid (illiquid) firms are defined as those firms whose ratio of Amihud illiquidity measure in post-
lockup [+21,+40] to pre-lockup [-40,-21] period is less than 1 (more than 1).  Amihud illiquidity measure is computed as 
|Rit|/DVOLit.  Shares offered is the number of shares issued to the public by the issuers.  Net proceeds is the total amount raised 
by the issuers excluding fees and expenses.  Offer price is the issuing price of the IPO shares.  Filing Price Range is defined as 
the difference between high and low filing price as a percentage of the low filing price.  Offer to close returns is the difference 
between the closing price and offer price as a percentage of the offer price.  Over-allotment shares represents the additional 
shares that issuer allows the underwriter to offer, typically 15% of the initial issue.  The number of underwriters includes lead 
and co-lead manager in the IPO process.  Lockup Days is the number of days that the insiders are prohibited from selling their 
shares in the aftermarket.  Lockup shares are the number of shares held by the managers, executives and other investors which 
are restricted from selling during the lockup period. These are denoted as shares eligible for future sale in the IPO prospectus.  
Firm age is measured from the founding year to the IPO year.  Shares outstanding represent the number of shares outstanding 
after IPO.  Market value is defined as the first day closing price multiplied by the number of shares outstanding after IPO.  The 
debt to asset ratio equals total debt divided by total assets.  Total assets, total liabilities, net sales, net income and returns on 
assets (ROA) are based on the most recent fiscal year ending prior to the IPO lockup expiration.  The mean and median 
comparisons of LIQ and ILLIQ samples are based on independent t-test and Wilcoxon Signed Ranks test, respectively.  
***
, 
**
, 
and 
* 
represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels for a two-tailed test, respectively. 
Panel A: All Firms (1609) 
 mean median std. dev. 
Offer Characteristics    
Shares Offered (million) 4.114 2.900 5.043 
Net Proceeds ($million) 60.942 35.828 99.816 
Offer Price ($) 12.636 12.000 4.302 
Filing Price Range (%) 17.243 16.667 6.655 
Offer to Close Returns (%) 20.327 10.294 37.579 
Over-allotment Shares (million) 0.704 0.465 0.866 
No. of Underwriters 2.800 2.000 1.490 
Lockup Days 194.751 180.000 62.116 
Lockup Shares (million) 12.796 8.014 20.002 
Firm Characteristics    
Firm Age (years) 14.623 8.000 19.175 
Shares Outstanding (million) 16.865 10.834 24.585 
Market Value ($million) 311.345 153.563 732.492 
Total Assets ($million) 218.242 25.957 1,574.374 
Total Liabilities ($million) 187.273 16.282 1,386.224 
Net Sales ($million) 163.994 31.909 790.641 
Net Income ($million) -0.715 0.831 36.195 
ROA -0.049 0.114 0.663 
Debt to Asset Ratio 0.355 0.261 0.487 
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Panel B: Liquid vs Illiquid Firms 
 LIQ Firms ILLIQ Firms Difference 
 (845) (764) LIQ – ILLIQ 
 mean median std. dev. mean median std. dev. mean median 
Offer Characteristics         
Shares Offered (million) 4.296 3.000 4.880 3.912 2.700 5.212 0.384 0.300*** 
       (1.52) (2.93) 
Net Proceeds ($million) 64.664 38.363 91.377 56.825 32.480 108.300 7.839 5.883*** 
       (1.56) (4.03) 
Offer Price ($) 12.747 12.500 4.206 12.514 12.000 4.404 0.233 0.500 
       (1.09) (1.40) 
Filing Price Range (%) 17.114 16.667 7.296 17.385 16.667 5.869 -0.271 0.000 
       (0.82) (0.55) 
Offer to Close Returns (%) 20.308 11.389 34.410 20.348 8.929 40.821 -0.040 2.460 
       (0.02) (1.39) 
Over-allotment Shares (million) 0.758 0.510 0.888 0.645 0.450 0.837 0.113*** 0.060*** 
       (2.61) (4.52) 
No. of Underwriters 2.920 3.000 1.558 2.669 2.000 1.401 0.251*** 1.000*** 
       (3.40) (3.96) 
Lockup Days 194.633 180.000 66.009 194.882 180.000 57.549 -0.249 0.000 
       (0.08) (1.18) 
Lockup Shares (million) 13.412 9.086 15.480 12.114 6.910 24.025 1.298 2.176*** 
       (1.27) (4.67) 
Firm Characteristics         
Firm Age (years) 14.586 8.000 19.088 14.665 8.000 19.285 -0.079 0.000 
       (-0.08) (0.27) 
Shares Outstanding (million) 17.605 11.850 18.499 16.047 9.706 29.900 1.558 2.144*** 
       (1.24) (5.08) 
Market Value ($million) 311.250 169.539 457.165 311.450 131.973 948.454 -0.200 37.566*** 
       (-0.01) (4.48) 
Total Assets ($million) 216.439 27.413 1,067.660 220.236 24.999 1,990.672 -3.797 2.414** 
       (-0.05) (2.17) 
Total Liabilities ($million) 186.232 15.842 971.621 188.423 16.894 1,733.632 -2.191 -1.052 
       (-0.03) (-0.79) 
Net Sales ($million) 159.326 32.525 506.632 169.157 30.971 1,016.579 -9.831 1.554 
       (-0.24) (0.96) 
Net Income ($million) -0.869 0.701 29.996 -0.544 1.003 42.019 -0.325 -0.302 
       (-0.18) (-1.48) 
ROA -0.047 0.104 0.687 -0.051 0.123 0.637 0.004 -0.019 
       (0.10) (-1.36) 
Debt to Asset Ratio 0.329 0.224 0.393 0.385 0.303 0.571 -0.056** -0.079*** 
       (-2.25) (-2.71) 
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Table 2 Quote and Trade Characteristics 
This table presents the summary statistics for the quote and trade activities for the entire sample as well as the liquid (LIQ) and illiquid (ILLIQ) subsamples around lockup expirations.  Liquid (illiquid) 
firms are those firms whose ratio of Amihud illiquidity measure in post-lockup to pre-lockup period is less than 1 (more than 1).  Amihud illiquidity measure is computed as |Rit|/DVOLit.  The pre- and post-
lockup expiration windows are [-40,-21] and [+21,+40] days with respect to the unlock day respectively.  We compute quoted and effective spreads in terms of dollars and percentages.  The quoted and 
effective spreads are averaged on the basis of time-weighting and trade-weighting respectively.  Depth is the sum of bid and ask depths measured in terms of share volume.  The number of trades is the total 
number of transactions per day.  Trade size is the average trading volume per transaction and trading value is the average of the product of price and quantity traded per day.  Return volatility is the standard 
deviation of the intraday returns.  The comparison of means and medians for LIQ vs ILLIQ in pre- and post-lockup periods are based on the independent t-test and Wilcoxon signed ranks tests.  For the 
comparison of the pre- and post-lockup means and medians, we compute the paired sample t-statistics and the z-statistics based on Wilcoxon signed ranks test in the parentheses. *, **, and *** represent the 
10%, 5%, and 1% two-tailed significance level, respectively. 
  
All Firms 
(1609) 
LIQ Firms 
(845) 
ILLIQ Firms 
(764) 
Difference 
LIQ – ILLIQ 
  
Pre 
[-40,-21] 
Post 
[+21,+40] 
Difference 
Pre – Post 
Pre 
[-40,-21] 
Post 
[+21,+40] 
Difference 
Pre – Post 
Pre 
[-40,-21] 
Post 
[+21,+40] 
Difference 
Pre – Post 
Pre 
[-40,-21] 
Post 
[+21,+40] 
Quote Activities 
Quoted dollar spread Mean 0.3726 0.3484 0.0242 0.3660 0.3262 0.0398 0.3798 0.3730 0.0068 -0.0138 -0.0468 
    (7.02) ***   (9.98) ***   (1.19) (-1.16) (-3.81) *** 
 Median 0.3256 0.2959 0.0297 0.3102 0.2692 0.0410 0.3345 0.3187 0.0158 -0.0243 -0.0495 
    (9.19) ***   (11.00) ***   (1.92) * (-1.66) * (-3.76) *** 
Quoted percentage spread Mean 0.0289 0.0301 -0.0012 0.0271 0.0228 0.0043 0.0310 0.0381 -0.0071 -0.0039 -0.0153 
    (-2.82) ***   (11.38) ***   (-10.80) *** (-3.50) *** (-10.84) *** 
 Median 0.0244 0.0236 0.0008 0.0223 0.0178 0.0045 0.0267 0.0314 -0.0047 -0.0044 -0.0136 
    (1.45)   (15.01) ***   (-12.09) *** (-3.69) *** (-12.47) *** 
Effective dollar spread Mean 0.2225 0.2073 0.0152*** 0.2176 0.1983 0.0193 0.2279 0.2174 0.0105 -0.0103 -0.0191 
    (5.97)   (6.83) ***   (2.43) ** (-1.50) (-2.79) *** 
 Median 0.1998 0.1809 0.0189 0.1919 0.1733 0.0186 0.2055 0.1853 0.0202 -0.0136 -0.0120 
    (7.72) ***   (7.77) ***   (3.12) *** (-1.83) * (-2.78) *** 
Effective percentage spread Mean 0.0170 0.0178 -0.0008 0.0160 0.0135 0.0025 0.0181 0.0227 -0.0046 -0.0021 -0.0092 
    (-3.16) ***   (10.44) ***   (-9.66) *** (-3.53) *** (-11.24) *** 
 Median 0.0152 0.0142 0.0010 0.0143 0.0117 0.0026 0.0161 0.0188 -0.0027 -0.0018 -0.0071 
    (1.39)   (13.52) ***   (-10.59) *** (-4.28) *** (-12.89) *** 
Depth Mean 3,429.26 4,667.14 -1,237.88 3,827.04 6,122.89 -2,295.85 2,989.30 3,057.04 -67.74 837.74 3,065.85 
    (-6.57) ***   (-7.46) ***   (-0.35) (1.78) * (5.39) *** 
 Median 247.95 343.60 -95.65 291.11 578.35 -287.24 206.92 196.00 10.92 84.19 382.35 
    (-10.66) ***   (-14.81)   (1.65) * (2.68) *** (8.28) *** 
Bid Depth Mean 1,670.79 2,209.51 -538.72 1,838.55 2,854.99 -1,016.44 1,485.24 1,495.60 -10.36 353.31 1,359.39 
    (-5.67) ***   (-6.91) ***   (-0.09) (1.53) (5.11) *** 
 Median 119.42 161.84 -42.42 145.40 274.05 -128.65 105.20 97.17 8.03 40.20 176.88 
    (-10.32) ***   (-14.06)   (1.28) (2.66) *** (8.21) *** 
Ask Depth Mean 1,758.47 2,457.62 -699.15 1,988.49 3,267.90 -1,279.41 1,504.06 1,561.44 -57.38 484.43 1,706.46 
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    (-6.75) ***   (-7.32) ***   (-0.60) (1.95) * (5.48) *** 
 Median 126.33 168.80 -42.47 146.16 296.70 -150.54 105.92 100.73 5.19 40.24 195.97 
    (-11.09) ***   (-15.06) ***   (1.36) (2.68) *** (8.33) *** 
Number of Quotes Mean 312.25 422.38 -110.13 384.08 554.20 -170.12 232.81 276.59 -43.78 151.27 277.61 
    (-6.94) ***   (-6.95) ***   (-2.26) ** (4.28) *** (5.57) *** 
 Median 15.72 18.05 -2.33 19.68 30.35 -10.67 13.58 12.10 1.48 6.10 18.25 
    (-7.21) ***   (-12.94) ***   (4.96) *** (3.36) *** (8.40) *** 
Trade Activities 
Number of Trades Mean 147.18 178.36 -31.18 142.76 234.58 -91.82 152.06 116.19 35.87 -9.30 118.39 
    (-3.70) ***   (-7.41) ***   (3.34) *** (-0.47) (6.53) *** 
 Median 32.85 40.45 -7.60 35.10 69.10 -34.00 30.53 22.81 7.72 4.57 46.29 
    (-7.81) ***   (-17.35) ***   (9.80) *** (1.63) (11.39) *** 
Trade Size Mean 95,554.63 123,209.72 -27,655.09 89,886.68 156,376.56 -66,489.88 101,823.50 86,526.50 15,297.00 -11,936.82 69,850.06 
    (-6.08) ***   (-10.53) ***   (2.47) ** (-1.39) (6.62) *** 
 Median 43,905.00 53,693.20 -9,788.20 44,090.00 84,370.00 -40,280.00 43,247.50 32,605.00 10,642.50 842.50 51,765.00 
    (-8.19) ***   (-16.86) ***   (8.08) *** (0.50) (12.71) *** 
Trading Value ($Thousand) Mean 2,341.60 2,749.34 -407.74 2,083.98 3,901.28 -1,817.30 2,626.54 1,475.26 1,151.28 -542.56 2,426.02 
    (-2.38) **   (-8.26) ***   (4.53) *** (-1.31) (6.92) *** 
 Median 633.87 685.12 -51.25 669.81 1,264.79 -594.98 604.57 345.65 258.92 65.24 919.14 
    (-4.94) ***   (-17.91) ***   (15.06) *** (1.50) (15.03) *** 
Return Volatility Mean 0.0143 0.0145 -0.0002 0.0133 0.0111 0.0022 0.0153 0.0181 -0.0028 -0.0020 -0.0070 
    (-0.98)   (11.08) ***   (-8.76) *** (-3.44) *** (-11.11) *** 
 Median 0.0122 0.0116 0.0006 0.0111 0.0090 0.0021 0.0130 0.0152 -0.0022 -0.0019 -0.0062 
    (-2.85) ***   (15.54) ***   (-10.61) *** (-4.06) *** (-11.86) *** 
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Table 3 Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) Around Lockup Expiration 
This table reports the mean and median values of the cumulative abnormal returns around IPO lockup expiration dates for all, Liquid (LIQ), and Illiquid 
(ILLIQ) firms.  Liquid (illiquid) firms are those firms whose ratio of Amihud illiquidity measure in post-lockup [+21,+40] to pre-lockup [-40,-21] period is less 
than 1 (more than 1).  Amihud illiquidity measure is computed as |Rit|/DVOLit.  CARs are based on a market model with the CRSP value-weighted index as the 
proxy for the market return and the estimation period is from day -120 to day -21.  The mean and median comparisons of LIQ and ILLIQ samples are based on 
the independent t-test and Wilcoxon Signed Ranks test, respectively.  
***
, 
**
, and 
* 
represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels for a two-tailed test, 
respectively. 
 All Firms LIQ Firms ILLIQ Firms Difference 
 (1609) (845) (764) LIQ - ILLIQ 
windows mean median mean median mean median mean median 
(-20,+20) -4.23%*** -3.48%*** 2.88%* 1.58%*** -12.09%*** -9.88%*** 14.97*** 11.46*** 
 (-6.42) (-2.60) (1.96) (3.43) (-11.38) (-7.38) (8.88) (8.81) 
(-10,+10) -3.74%*** -3.21%*** 0.03% -1.36% -7.91%*** -5.08%*** 7.94*** 3.72*** 
 (-6.95) (-4.45) (-0.14) (0.12) (-9.93) (-6.58) (7.21) (6.29) 
(-5,+5) -2.27%*** -1.75%*** -0.26% -0.84% -4.49%*** -3.38%*** 4.23*** 2.54*** 
 (-5.59) (-3.20) (0.08) (0.19) (-8.19) (-4.85) (5.25) (4.59) 
(-1,+1) -1.73%*** -1.33%*** -1.30%*** -1.11%*** -2.22%*** -1.61%*** 0.92* 0.50 
 (-8.80) (-4.85) (-4.27) (-2.70) (-8.28) (-4.19) (1.95) (1.59) 
(0,0) -0.87%*** -0.50%*** -0.55%** -0.36% -1.22%*** -0.70%*** 0.67** 0.34** 
 (-7.04) (-3.10) (-2.48) (-1.05) (-7.61) (-3.40) (2.29) (2.05) 
(+2,+5) 0.19% -0.39% 1.39%*** 0.19%** -1.14%*** -1.02%** 2.53*** 1.21*** 
 (1.07) (0.05) (4.53) (2.40) (-3.21) (-2.45) (5.06) (4.85) 
(+2,+10) -0.04% -0.63% 2.08%*** 0.70%*** -2.38%*** -1.87%*** 4.46*** 2.57*** 
 (0.18) (-0.05) (4.34) (3.57) (-4.30) (-3.83) (6.14) (5.68) 
(+2,+20) -0.19% -0.82% 3.92%*** 2.18%*** -4.72%*** -3.75%*** 8.64*** 5.93*** 
 (-0.27) (0.70) (5.52) (5.50) (-6.19) (-4.77) (8.47) (8.52) 
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Table 4 Regression Analysis of Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR) Around Lockup Expiration 
This table reports the regression results for the cumulative abnormal returns around the lockup expiration period.  The dependent variables are the CAR(-20,+20) and CAR(+2,+20) in panels 
A and B, respectively.  CARs are based on the market model with the CRSP value-weighted index as the proxy for the market return and the estimation period runs from day -120 to day -21.  
VC is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm is venture capital backed; otherwise zero.  DILLIQ is the average ratio of Amihud illiquidity measure in the post-lockup (+40,+21) to pre-
lockup (-21,-40) period. Amihud illiquidity measure is computed as |Rit|/DVOLit.  INSIDE is defined as the ratio of insider sales of shares in the period (0,+20) to the number of shares locked 
up. Insiders are directors, committees, officers, affiliates, and beneficial owners who are subject to lockup restrictions of investment bankers.  OI is the order imbalance defined as the sum of 
(sell dollar volume – buy dollar volume)/daily trading value during the CAR window.  SUPPLY is defined as the sum of (daily trading value – normal trading value)/normal trading value 
during (-20,+20).  Normal trading volume is computed based on the average daily trading value during day -120 to day -21.  RUNUP the rate of return for each firm computed from the 
closing price on listing date to day -41.  TECH refers to technology firms and is a dummy variable that equals 1 if identified as high tech in SDC database; otherwise zero.  NYSE is equal to 1 
if the firm is NYSE-listed; otherwise zero.  UWREP is the underwriter reputation which equals to 1 if Jay Ritter’s underwriter ranking is greater than 8; otherwise zero.   t-value is in the 
parentheses. *, **, and *** represent the 10%, 5%, and 1% two-tailed significance level, respectively. The t-statistics in the parentheses are White heteroskedasticity-consistent. 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 
Panel A: CAR(-20,+20) 
Intercept -0.0386*** -0.0145 -0.0446*** -0.0372*** -0.0615*** -0.0325*** -0.0220** -0.0478*** -0.0341** 0.0145 -0.0518*** 0.0247* 
 (-4.01) (-1.46) (-5.22) (-4.26) (-6.96) (-4.06) (-2.36) (-5.20) (-2.84) (1.00) (-5.65) (1.68) 
DILLIQ -0.0050**         -0.0066***  -0.0044** 
 (-2.10)         (-2.90)  (-2.18) 
VC  -0.0729***        -0.0656***  -0.0704*** 
  (-4.28)        (-3.67)  (-4.02) 
INSIDE   -0.1108**       -0.0783  -0.0867* 
   (-1.96)       (-1.56)  (-1.70) 
OI    -0.0064***       -0.0054*** -0.0083*** 
    (-3.39)       (-2.93) (-4.52) 
SUPPLY     0.0005***      0.0005*** 0.0005*** 
     (3.36)      (3.38) (3.53) 
RUNUP      -0.2018***    -0.2000***  -0.1997*** 
      (-9.92)    (-9.85)  (-9.84) 
TECH       -0.0484***   -0.0120  -0.0170 
       (-2.99)   (-0.71)  (-1.02) 
NYSE        -0.0048  -0.0445**  -0.0690*** 
        (-0.25)  (-2.14)  (-3.13) 
UWREP         -0.0224 0.0162  0.0092 
         (-1.36) (1.00)  (0.58) 
N 1609 1609 1609 1609 1609 1609 1609 1609 1609 1609 1609 1609 
Adj. R
2
 0.003 0.011 0.003 0.005 0.032 0.128 0.005 -0.001 0.0004 0.142 0.035 0.178 
F-statistic 5.76** 18.99*** 5.87** 8.67*** 53.33*** 236.23*** 8.30*** 0.03 1.65 38.95*** 30.01*** 39.66*** 
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Panel B: CAR(+2,+20) 
Intercept 0.0014 0.0047 -0.0059 0.0025 -0.0188*** 0.00002*** -0.0040 -0.0062 -0.0030 0.0111 -0.0109** 0.0135 
 (0.24) (0.77) (-1.17) (0.49) (-3.62) (0.003) (-0.68) (-1.13) (-0.37) (1.21) (-2.04) (1.46) 
DILLIQ -0.0037**         -0.0041***  -0.0021** 
 (-3.00)         (-3.32)  (-2.10) 
VC  -0.0225**        -0.0273**  -0.0305*** 
  (-2.21)        (-2.41)  (-2.77) 
INSIDE   0.0060       0.0157  -0.0007 
   (0.19)       (0.54)  (-0.02) 
OI    -0.0103***       -0.0095*** -0.0112*** 
    (-5.48)       (-5.02) (-5.78) 
SUPPLY     0.0009***      0.0008*** 0.0008*** 
     (4.42)      (4.36) (4.20) 
RUNUP      -0.0734***    -0.0744***  -0.0752*** 
      (-7.19)    (-7.31)  (-7.37) 
TECH       -0.0032   0.0122  0.0067 
       (-0.32)   (1.14)  (0.65) 
NYSE        0.0039  -0.0068  -0.0223 
        (0.31)  (-0.52)  (-1.61) 
UWREP         -0.0043 0.0051  0.0005 
         (-0.42) (0.49)  (0.05) 
N 1609 1609 1609 1609 1609 1609 1609 1609 1609 1609 1609 1609 
Adj. R
2
 0.005 0.003 -0.001 0.014 0.041 0.047 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.054 0.052 0.105 
F-statistic 8.70*** 5.05** 0.05 23.01** 69.52*** 80.97*** 0.10 0.06 0.17 14.12*** 45.21*** 22.00*** 
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Table 5 Robust Regression Analysis of Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR) Around Lockup Expiration 
This table reports the regression results for the cumulative abnormal returns around the lockup expiration period.  The dependent variable is the CAR(-20,+20).  CARs are based on the market model 
with the CRSP value-weighted index as the proxy for the market return and the estimation period is from day -120 to day -21.  VC is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm is venture capital 
backed; otherwise zero.  ILLIQ_INDEX is computed based on the 5 variables: time-weighted percentage quoted spread, trade-weighted percentage effective spread, total trading hours divided number of 
trades, $1million divided dollar value of trade, and daily return volatility.  We first compute the ratio of each variable in the post-lockup (+40,+21) to pre-lockup (-21,-40) period.  We then compute the 
equally-weighted values based on the ratios.  INSIDE is defined as the ratio of insider sales of shares in the period (0,+20) to the number of shares locked up. Insiders are directors, committees, 
officers, affiliates, and beneficial owners who are subject to lockup restrictions of investment bankers.  OI is the order imbalance defined as the sum of (sell dollar volume – buy dollar 
volume)/daily trading value during the CAR window.  SUPPLY is defined as the sum of (daily trading value – normal trading value)/normal trading value during (-20,+20).  Normal trading 
volume is computed based on the average daily trading value during day -120 to day -21.  RUNUP the rate of return for each firm computed from the closing price on listing date to day -41.  
TECH refers to technology firms and is a dummy variable that equals 1 if identified as high tech in SDC database; otherwise zero.  NYSE is equal to 1 if the firm is NYSE-listed; otherwise 
zero.  UWREP is the underwriter reputation which equals to 1 if Jay Ritter’s underwriter ranking is greater than 8; otherwise zero.   t-value is in the parentheses. *, **, and *** represent the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% two-tailed significance level, respectively. The t-statistics in the parentheses are White heteroskedasticity-consistent. 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 
Panel A: CAR(-20,+20) 
Intercept 0.1433*** -0.0145 -0.0446*** -0.0372*** -0.0615*** -0.0325*** -0.0220** -0.0478*** -0.0341** 0.2239*** -0.0518*** 0.1960 
 (6.02) (-1.46) (-5.22) (-4.26) (-6.96) (-4.06) (-2.36) (-5.20) (-2.84) (8.48) (-5.65) (7.03) 
ILLIQ_INDEX -0.1793***         -0.1960***  -0.1636*** 
 (-8.57)         (-9.98)  (-7.80) 
VC  -0.0729***        -0.0638***  -0.0681*** 
  (-4.28)        (-3.73)  (-4.02) 
INSIDE   -0.1108**       -0.1089*  -0.1103** 
   (-1.96)       (-1.94)  (-1.97) 
OI    -0.0064***       -0.0054*** -0.0053*** 
    (-3.39)       (-2.93) (-2.92) 
SUPPLY     0.0005***      0.0005*** 0.0004*** 
     (3.36)      (3.38) (3.82) 
RUNUP      -0.2018***    -0.2006***  -0.2000*** 
      (-9.92)    (-10.00)  (-9.95) 
TECH       -0.0484***   -0.0180  -0.0206 
       (-2.99)   (-1.11)  (-1.28) 
NYSE        -0.0048  -0.0486**  -0.0638*** 
        (-0.25)  (-2.55)  (-3.15) 
UWREP         -0.0224 0.0021  -0.0005 
         (-1.36) (0.13)  (-0.03) 
N 1609 1609 1609 1609 1609 1609 1609 1609 1609 1609 1609 1609 
Adj. R
2
 0.051 0.011 0.003 0.005 0.032 0.128 0.005 -0.001 0.0004 0.196 0.035 0.214 
F-statistic 87.81*** 18.99*** 5.87** 8.67*** 53.33*** 236.23*** 8.30*** 0.03 1.65 57.12*** 30.01*** 49.64*** 
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Panel B: CAR(+2,+20) 
Intercept 0.1094*** 0.0047 -0.0059 0.0025 -0.0188*** 0.00002*** -0.0040 -0.0062 -0.0030 0.1299*** -0.0109** 0.1016*** 
 (7.03) (0.77) (-1.17) (0.49) (-3.62) (0.003) (-0.68) (-1.13) (-0.37) (6.89) (-2.04) (4.66) 
ILLIQ_INDEX -0.1077***         -0.1119***  -0.0813*** 
 (-7.70)         (-7.81)  (-4.78) 
VC  -0.0225**        -0.0262**  -0.0288*** 
  (-2.21)        (-2.41)  (-2.69) 
INSIDE   0.0060       -0.0015  -0.0092 
   (0.19)       (-0.05)  (-0.29) 
OI    -0.0103***       -0.0095*** -0.0093*** 
    (-5.48)       (-5.02) (-4.75) 
SUPPLY     0.0009***      0.0008*** 0.0006*** 
     (4.42)      (4.36) (3.15) 
RUNUP      -0.0734***    -0.0748***  -0.0757*** 
      (-7.19)    (-7.33)  (-7.39) 
TECH       -0.0032   0.0087  0.0055 
       (-0.32)   (0.85)  (0.54) 
NYSE        0.0039  -0.0088  -0.0219* 
        (0.31)  (-0.71)  (-1.65) 
UWREP         -0.0043 -0.0029  -0.0045 
         (-0.42) (-0.28)  (-0.44) 
N 1609 1609 1609 1609 1609 1609 1609 1609 1609 1609 1609 1609 
Adj. R
2
 0.052 0.003 -0.001 0.014 0.041 0.047 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.103 0.052 0.129 
F-statistic 89.68*** 5.05** 0.05 23.01** 69.52*** 80.97*** 0.10 0.06 0.17 27.46*** 45.21*** 27.42*** 
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Table 6 Predictive Regressions 
This table reports the regression results for the cumulative abnormal returns around the lockup expiration period.  The dependent 
variable is CAR (+11,+20).  CARs are based on the market model with the CRSP value-weighted index as the proxy for the 
market return and the estimation period is from day -120 to day -21.  VC is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm is 
venture capital backed; otherwise zero.  In Model 1, ΔILLIQ is the average ratio of Amihud illiquidity measure in the post-
lockup (+2,+10) to pre-lockup (-2,-10) period. Amihud illiquidity measure is computed as |Rit|/DVOLit.  In Model 2, 
ΔILLIQ is computed based on the 5 variables: time-weighted percentage quoted spread, trade-weighted percentage effective 
spread, total trading hours divided number of trades, $1million divided dollar value of trade, and daily return volatility.  We first 
compute the ratio of each variable in the post-lockup to pre-lockup period.  We then compute the equally-weighted values based 
on the ratios. INSIDE is defined as the ratio of insider sales of shares in the period (0,+20) to the number of shares locked 
up. Insiders are directors, committees, officers, affiliates, and beneficial owners who are subject to lockup restrictions of 
investment bankers.  OI is the order imbalance defined as the sum of (sell dollar volume – buy dollar volume)/daily trading 
value during the CAR window.  SUPPLY is defined as the sum of (daily trading value – normal trading value)/normal 
trading value during (+11, +20).  Normal trading volume is computed based on the average daily trading value during day -
120 to day -21.  RUNUP the rate of return for each firm computed from the closing price on listing date to day -41.  TECH 
refers to technology firms and is a dummy variable that equals 1 if identified as high tech in SDC database; otherwise zero.  
NYSE is equal to 1 if the firm is NYSE-listed; otherwise zero.  UWREP is the underwriter reputation which equals to 1 if 
Jay Ritter’s underwriter ranking is greater than 8; otherwise zero.   t-value is in the parentheses. *, **, and *** represent the 10%, 
5%, and 1% two-tailed significance level, respectively. The t-statistics in the parentheses are White heteroskedasticity-consistent.   
 
Model 1 Model 2 
INTERCEPT 0.0171*** 
(2.61) 
0.0448*** 
(3.40) 
 ΔILLIQ -0.0020** 
(-2.23) 
-0.0281*** 
(2.67) 
VC -0.0059 
(-0.75) 
-0.0056 
(-0.70) 
INSIDE -0.0148 
(-0.72) 
-0.0179 
(-0.80) 
OI -0.0170*** 
(-8.01) 
-0.0167*** 
(-7.86) 
SUPPLY 0.0016*** 
(8.05) 
0.0016*** 
(7.62) 
RUNUP -0.0438*** 
(-5.55) 
-0.0444*** 
(-5.46) 
TECH -0.0080 
(-1.06) 
-0.0091 
(-1.18) 
NYSE -0.0059 
(-0.72) 
-0.0069 
(-0.84) 
UWREP -0.0008 
(-0.11) 
-0.0012 
(-0.15) 
N 1609 1609 
Adj. R
2
 0.101 0.103 
F-statistic 21.11*** 21.00*** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
